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THE MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER PRIVILEGE IN
THE WAKE OF JAFFE V. REDMOND
ROBERT H. ARONSON*
I. Introduction
Many of the revisions to article V of the Uniform Rules of Evidence' involved
stylistic, nonsubstantive changes.' In particular, all language was made gender
neutral. The most substantial revision was to Rule 503, formerly titled "Physician
and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege." This revision broadened the scope of the
privilege to include a general "mental health provider" privilege,3 in accord with the
trend in the states and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond
In Jaffee, the Court recognized for the first time a federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege and extended the privilege to confidential communications with a licensed
social worker in the course of psychotherapy.' In addition, most of the states have
adopted some form of a "licensed social worker" privilege.' This privilege usually
is not a subpart of the psychotherapist or physician privilege Since the states do
not uniformly define the type of provider whom the privilege covers, Uniform Rule
503 provides flexible definitions and a general mental health provider privilege in
order to subsume the range of privileges offered by the states.! In addition to
expanding the privilege itself, Rule 503 was amended to provide five additional
exclusions to the privilege.
Although several other privileges were considered as amendments, no new
privileges were added to article V.'0 One such privilege that was discussed is the
parent-child privilege." Although there has been an effort to seek recognition of
a parent-child privilege, it was not incorporated into article V due to consistent
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., University of Virginia, 1969, J.D., University
of Pennsylvania, 1973. Member, Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all textual references and citations to the "Uniform Rules" or
"Uniform Rules of Evidence" refer to the Uniform Rules of Evidence as last revised in 1999.
2. UNIF. R. EVID. art. 5. All drafts and the final act incorporating the revisions are available at the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Liws Web page: http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll
ulclulc..frame.htm.
3. UNi. R. EVID. 503.
4. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
5. Id. at 15.
6. UNIF. R. EvtD. 503 reporter's notes, at 97-98; see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 16-17 nn.16 & 17.
7. UNIF. R. EVID. 503 reporter's notes, at 99.
8. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(2), (4), (5).
9. UNiF. R. EVID. 503(d)(4)-(8).
10. UNIF. R. EvtD. 501 reporters notes, at 86.
11. Id.
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rejection of the privilege at both the federal and state level." The eight U.S. Courts
of Appeals that have been presented with the issue have explicitly declined to
recognize the parent-child privilege, 3 and the remaining U.S. Courts of Appeals,
while not expressly rejecting the privilege, have chosen not to recognize it.'
Moreover, in the state courts, approximately one-third of the states have been
presented with the issue and similarly have refused to recognize the privilege."
Only four states recognize some form of the privilege. Idaho and Minnesota
statutorily recognize the privilege, 6 while New York is the only state to recognize
the privilege judicially, although it has been applied narrowly. 7 Lastly, Mas-
sachusetts, although not recognizing a full-fledged parent-child testimonial privilege,
does not permit a minor child to testify against a parent in a criminal proceeding."
Even in these states, however, the privilege, as applied, is relatively weak.
Consequently, with such lack of enthusiasm for the privilege in the states and
federal courts, the privilege was not adopted in the revisions to the Uniform Rules
of Evidence.
There has been a strong sentiment at the federal level to include a privilege for
confidential communications between a sexual-assault counselor and a victim. 9
However, in light of the Supreme Court's recognition of a psychotherapist-patient
12. See UNIF. R. EVID. 501 reporters notes, at 86-87.
13. UNIF. R. EVID. 501 reporters notes, at 87 (citing In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1988); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893
(7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511
(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (en bane)).
14. UNIF. R. EviD. 501 reporter's notes, at 87.
15. Id. (citing Arizona, Stewart v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); California,
In re Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Florida, Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Illinois, People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241 (Iii. 1983); Indiana, Gibbs v.
State, 426 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct App. 1981); Cissna v. State, 352 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
Iowa, State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981); Maine, State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1022
(Me. 1987); State v. Delong, 456 A.2d 877 (Me. 1983); Massachusetts, Three Juveniles v. Common-
wealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983); Michigan, State v. Amos, 414 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987) (per curiam); Mississippi, Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1985); Missouri, State v. Bruce,
655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); New Jersey, In re Gall D., 525 A.2d 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987); Oregon, State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. v. Gibson, 718 P.2d 759 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Rhode
Island, In re Frances J., 456 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1983); Texas, de Leon v. State, 684 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.
1984); Vermont, In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790 (Vt. 1996); Washington, State v. Maxon, 110
Wash. 2d 564 (Wash. 1988)).
16. UNIF. R. EviD. 501 reporter's notes, at 88 (citing IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1990 & Supp. 1995);
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)0) (1988 & Supp. 1996)).
17. UNIF. R. EvtD. 501 reporter's notes, at 87-88 (citing In re Mark G., 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978); In re A. & M., 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d
931 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1984); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979)).
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privilege that includes licensed social workers," a sexual-assault counselor-victim
privilege is subsumed more appropriately under Uniform Rule 503, which has been
amended to include a "mental health worker" privilege.2 The remaining miscel-
laneous privileges that have developed are either not well recognized or insuf-
ficiently supported. Thus, since privileges by their very nature obstruct the
revelation of probative evidence, ' these additional privileges were not incorporated
into article V.
The lawyer-client privilege, Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(a)(5), is substantially
unchanged. However, the definition of "representative of the lawyer" was revised
to include not only an actual employee of the lawyer, but also one "reasonably
believed by the client to be employed."' Typically, communications between a
client and a person the client reasonably believes to be a lawyer are protected.'
In addition, communications between a client and representatives (e.g., secretaries,
paralegals, or law clerks) of the lawyer are also protected as part of the privilege.'
Under the Uniform Rule 502(a)(5) definition, the client retains the benefit of
protection for communications intended to be confidential where the client
reasonably, but mistakenly, believes a representative to be employed by the
attorney.' The test is "partially subjective."' Nonetheless "there must be some
reasonable basis for the belief."2s
Under Rule 505, the religious privilege, the communicant holds the privilege, and
the cleric may only assert the privilege on behalf of the communicant.' The
drafters gave some consideration to extending the privilege to the cleric, such that
both the cleric and the communicant would be holders of the privilege" Although
20. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
21. UNtF. R. EviD. 501 reporter's notes, at 89-90; see also United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97,
99 (D. Mass. 1999) (extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege to rape crisis counselors who were
neither licensed psychotherapists nor social workers but were under the direct control and supervision
of a licensed social worker, nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychotherapist).
22. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (holding that privileges undermine the
basic principle that the public "has a right to every man's evidence," such that they "must be strictly
construed"); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175
(1979) ("Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974) ("Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
23. UNIF. R. EVuD. 502(a)(5).
24. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. e, at 552 (1998); 8
JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2302 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Consol. Litig.
Concerning Intl Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. III. 1987)
(collecting cases); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. f
(1998).
26. UNIF. R. EVID. 502 reporter's notes, at 93.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. UNIF. R. EViD. 505.
30. UNiF. R. EVID. 505 reporters notes, at 112.
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almost every state recognizes some form of religious privilege,3 only a small
minority make the cleric the holder of the privilege.2 Thus, Rule 505 was not
revised to allow the cleric to be the holder of the privilege.
Rule 510 was revised to incorporate both voluntary and involuntary waiver of a
privilege into one comprehensive rule.3 As revised, subdivision (a) defines
voluntary disclosure, the substance of which remains unchanged. Subdivision (b)
now defines involuntary disclosure and former Rule 511 was deleted. Again, the
substance of involuntary disclosure remains unchanged. The rule does not deal with
"inadvertent disclosure," however, because the courts already have adopted various
approaches to determine whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes waiver of a
privilege. Most states apply an "objective analysis" in which the inadvertent
disclosure unquestionably results in waiver since the "confidentiality" of the
document has been breached.' Conversely, a few states employ a "subjective"
31. UNIF. R. EVID. 505 reporter's notes, at 110-12.
32. UNIl. R. EviD. 505 reporter's notes, at 11-12. The Reporter's Note to Rule 505 states:
[l]n the following states the statutes confer the privilege solely upon the cleric: GEORGIA,
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-22 (Michie Supp. 1992); ILLINOIS, Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 110, § 8-803
(Smith-Hurd 1984); INDIANA, Ind. Code Ann. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns Supp. 1992);
MARYLAND, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-111 (1984), interpreted in McLain, 5
Maryland Practice, Maryland Evidence State and Federal 506.1 (1984), to the effect that
the language in the statute, "A minister.. . may not be compelled ..... " vests the
privilege in the cleric, rather than the communicant, by relying on the Illinois decision in
People v. Pecora, 107 IlL App. 2d 286, 246 N.E.2d 865, 873 (1969) and the Fourth
Circuit decision in Seidman v. Fishburn-Hudgins Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d [413, 413-
416 (4th Cir. 1984); MICHIGAN, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.945(2) [M.C.L.. § 76Z5a(2) (Law.
Co-op Supp. 1992)]; NEw JERSEY, N.J. R. EvidL 37, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:84A-29, construed
in State v. Szemple, 263 N.J. Super. 98, 622 A.2d 248 (1993) to confer the privilege solely
upon the cleric; VERMONT, Vt. Stat Ann. Tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); and WYOMING, Wyo.
Stat. § 1-12-101 (1991). On the other hand, in the following two states, in which the
statutes do not expressly refer to the communicant, they have been construed to confer the
privilege solely upon the cleric: MISSOURI, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.060 (Vernon Supp. 1992),
construed in Eckmann v. Board of Educ. Of Hawthorne School District No. 17, 106
F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) to confer the privilege solely upon the cleric; and
VIRGINIA, Va Code Ann. § &01-400 (Michie 1992) and Va. Code Ann. § 19.271.3
(Michie 1992) construed in Seidman v. Fishburn-Hudgins Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d
413, 415-416 (4th Cir. 1984), to confer the privilege solely upon the cleric.
Finally, in the following states, the privilege is conferred on both the cleric and the
communicant: Alabama, Ala Code § 12-21-166 (1986); California, Cal. Evid. Code, §§
1030-34 (West 1966); and Puerto Rico, P.R. R. Evid. 28.
See further State v. Szemple, 263 N.J. Super. 98, 622 A.2d 248 (1993), containing an
excellent summary of the status of the law concerning the holder of the religious privilege
in the several states.
Id.
33. UNIF. R. EVID. 510.
34. UNIF. R. EvID. 510 reporter's notes, at 117-18 (citing Alabama, Bassett v. Newton, 658 So. 2d
398 (Ala. 1995); Alaska, Lowery v. State, 762 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1988); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784
(Alaska 1979); Arizona, State v. Cuffle, 828 P.2d 773 (Ariz. 1992); Arkansas, Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Little, 639 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1982); California, Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Ins., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Colorado, Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1992); Idaho, Farr v. Mischler, 923 P.2d 446 (Idaho
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analysis in which inadvertent disclosure never results in true waiver since there was
no "intent" to do so." And twelve states utilize some form of a balancing
analysis?6 Most commonly, courts consider the following five factors to determine
whether the privilege has been waived by a party: "(1) the reasonableness of the
precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3)
the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the overriding
issue of fairness."'37
1992); Iowa, State v. Randle, 484 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1992); Kentucky, Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985); Maine, Northup v. State, 272 A.2d 747 (Me. 1971); Minnesota, State v.
Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1987); Mississippi, Alexander v. State, 358 So. 2d 379 (Miss. 1979);
Nevada, Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist., 891 P.2d 1180 (Nev. 1995); Ohio, State v. McDermott, 607
N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Oklahoma, Driskell v. State, 1983 OK CR 22, 659 P.2d 343; Herbert
v. Chi., Rock I. & Pac. R.R. Co., 1975 OK 160, 544 P.2d 898; Rhode Island, State v. Von Bulow, 475
A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984); South Carolina, Marshall v. Marshall, 320 S.E.2d 44 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984);
Virginia, Clagett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 263 (Va. 1996); West Virginia, State ex rel. McCormick
v. Zakaib, 430 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1993); Marano v. Holland, 366 S.E.2d 117 (W. Va. 1988)).
35. UNit. R. EVID. 510 reporter's notes, at 119 (citing Delaware, Moyer v. Moyer, 602 A.2d 68 (Del.
1992); Indiana, Hazlewood v. State, 609 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. 1993); Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279 (Ind.
1988); Michigan, Sterling v. Keidan, 412 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); New Jersey, Trilogy
Communications, Inc. v. Excom Realty, Inc., 652 A.2d 1273 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994)).
36. UNIF. R. EVID. 510 reporter's notes, at 119-20. The Reporter's Notes to Rule 510 indicate:
[T]here appear to be nine states that employ a balancing analysis in determining whether
there is a waiver of the privilege through an inadvertent disclosure. See ILLINOIS, Dalen
v. Ozite Corporation, 230 111. App. 3rd 18, 594 NE.2d 1365 (1992). See also, People v.
Knuckles, 165 ll.2d 125, 650 N.E.2d 974, 209 lILDec. 1 (1995); MONTANA, Pacificorp
v. Department of Revenue of the State of Montana, 254 Mont. 38Z 838 P.2d 914 (1992);
NEBRASKA, League v. Vanice, 374 . W.2d 849 (1985); NEW MExico, Hartman v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 1144 (1988); NEw YORK, Manufacturers and traders Trust
Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, 522 N.YS.2d 999 (Sup. Cf. App. Div. 1987);
NORTH DAKOTA, Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Heuther, 454 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990);
OREGON, Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd, 314 04. [sic] 336, 838 P.2d 1069
(1992); UTAH, Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corporation, 805 P.2d
164 (Utah 1991); WASHINGTON, State v. Balkin, 48 Wash. App. 1, 737 P.2d 1035 (Wash.
App. 1987).
See also, KANSAS, which has applied a "balance of interests" test in determining
whether a qualified privilege of so-called "self-critical analysis" has been waived. See
Kansas, Gas & Elec. v. Eye, 214 Kan. 419, 789 P.2d 1161 (1990). In MARYLAND, a
balancing test is applied in determining a right of access to records of internal police
investigations that are confidential. See Blades v. Woods, 107 Md. App. 178, 667 A.2d
917 (1995). In TExAs, a balancing test is also applied by weighing the (1) circumstances
confirming an involuntary disclosure; (2) precautionary measures taken; (3) delay in
rectifying the error;, (4) extent of any inadvertent disclosure; and (5) scope of discovery.
Inadvertent production is distinguishable from involuntary production and will constitute
a waiver. Granada Corp. v. Honorable First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex
1992).
Id. (parenthetical explanations omitted).
37. UNIF. R. EVID. 510 reporter's notes, at 117 (citing Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v.
Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. I1. 1990); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D.
179 (N.D. Cal. 1990)). For a comprehensive analysis of inadvertent disclosure, see REAGAN WM.
SIMPSON, CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DEPOSITIONS § 3.41 (2d ed. 1994).
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In addition, Uniform Rule of Evidence 612 may be implicated in the waiver issue
with respect to whether supplying an expert with attorney work-product information
to assist in the development of theories of the case constitutes a waiver of the
attorney-client and work-product privileges under Rule 612?" Specifically, Rule
612 allows an opposing party to review written materials used to refresh the
recollection of a witness' 9 The question remains whether furnishing written
materials to an expert might sufficiently influence the expert's testimony to implicate
Rule 612 and thus waive the privilege or attorney work-product.' These issues
continue to evolve through judicial decisions. For this reason, inadvertent disclosure
was not dealt with in the revision of Uniform Rule 510.
I. The Mental Health Provider Privilege
As a general maxim of the common law of evidence, recognition of testimonial
privileges frustrates the time-honored principle requiring full disclosure of all
relevant evidence. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[T]he public...
has a right to every man's evidence." '4t Therefore, new privileges have been
established reluctantly, and the scope of existing privileges has been no broader than
necessary to effectuate the bases for the privilege. The original Uniform Rules
recognized a physician and psychotherapist privilege.42 In considering the definition
and scope of the privilege, the drafters of the new Uniform Rules looked to a
number of developments since the establishment of the original exception, such as
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee, subsequent developments in
the federal courts, and developments in the various states. Uniform Rule 503, the
mental health provider privilege, was drafted in light of those developments.
A. The Jaffee v. Redmond Decision
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness ... shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in light of reason and experience."'" Hence, the Court
in Jaffee concluded that Federal Rule 501 "did not freeze the law governing the
privileges," and that exceptions may be established where justifiable public and
private ends, in light of the court's reason and experience, outweigh the need for
probative evidence."
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized a federal common law privilege for
confidential communications between a psychotherapist and a patient. The Jaffee
decision demonstrated the Court's intent to provide substantial protection to
38. See UNIF. R. EViD. 612.
39. Id.
40. UNiF. R. EvID. 510 reporter's notes, at 121; see also Reagan Win. Simpson et al., Recent
Developments in Civil Procedure and Evidence, 32 ToRT & INS. L.J. 249 (1997).
41. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (citations omitted); see also supra note 22.
42. UNIF. R. EvID. 503 (revised 1999), 13A U.L.A. pt. IB, at 260-61 (2000).
43. FED. R. EVIO. 501 (emphasis added).
44. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980)).
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therapeutic relationships by establishing a strong psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Persuaded that the important private and public ends that would result from the
recognition of a federal psychotherapist privilege outweighed the time-honored
principle that all probative evidence should be disclosed, the Court held that the
privilege applied to confidential communications made to licensed psychotherapists
in the course of diagnosis or treatment.!' Although the Court left the contours of
the privilege undefined, it did extend the privilege to a licensed social worker in
Jaffee, noting that those who seek out social workers are often poorer than those
who are able to afford a psychiatrist or psychologist.4
In the light of "reason and experience," the Jaffee Court underscored the unique
nature of the relationship between a patient and psychotherapist. 7 Because a
patient must disclose his or her innermost fears and fantasies for effective therapy,
this relationship is distinguishable from even the physician-patient or attorney-client
relationships, which do not necessarily require such intimate detail for effective
counsel." Disclosure of such information would surely chill therapeutic relations
and prevent members of the community from receiving adequate counseling.!9 As
noted by the Jaffee Court, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee stated in the notes
to its proposed rules of evidence to Congress that "there is wide agreement that
confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment."' Thus, the
Court determined that protection of confidential communications with
psychotherapists "serves important private interests."5' Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that not every patient can afford to consult with a psychiatrist or
psychologists and extended the privilege to confidential communications made to
social workers (who traditionally serve lower income clients) in the course of
psychotherapy.n
In addition to the nature of the psychotherapeutic relationship itself, the Court
was persuaded by several other factors supporting creation of the privilege. Most
importantly, a privilege must serve a valuable public end to be valid. As such, the
Court stated that "[the mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical
health, is a public good of transcendent importance."' Furthermore, the Court
explained that declining to recognize the privilege would not have a substantial
evidentiary impact. According to the Court, "If the privilege were rejected,
confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely
be chilled .... Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 15-16.
47. Id. at 10.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10-11; see also Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973) (advisory committee notes).
51. Id. at 11.
52. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 16.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id. at 11.
20011
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litigants such as petitioners seek access ... is unlikely to come into being."55
Moreover, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had enacted some form of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.' Thus, according to the Court, "[T]he
existence of a consensus among the States indicates that 'reason and experience'
support the recognition of the privilege."'
In addition, recognition at the federal level would further protect a privilege
provided at the state level by preventing litigants from removing to federal court for
a more beneficial evidentiary standard." Also, the psychotherapist-patient privilege
was among those recommended to Congress in its proposed privilege rules. 9 The
Court concluded that "a psychotherapist-patient privilege will serve a 'public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth."'" Based on these beneficial public and private ends, the Court
held "that confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her
patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled
disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."'"
By extending the privilege to licensed social workers for purposes of equality, the
Court broadly democratized the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. In
addition, the Court provided predictability and certainty to the privilege by rejecting
the Seventh Circuit's balancing approach.' According to the Court, allowing the
availability of the privilege to be contingent upon a judge's in camera determination
of necessity would defeat the purpose of the privilege.' Ultimately, however,
although the Court created this privilege, it left the definition of its substance to the
lower federal courts on a case-by-case basis.
B. Federal Decisions Developing the Privilege After Jaffee
Because the Jaffee Court did not delineate the contours of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, it has been left to the lower federal courts to further define the
privilege.' One obvious area of uncertainty is who will be considered a
"psychotherapist" for purposes of the privilege. The courts have also considered the
type of communications that should be protected and the exceptions that should be
recognized. The most litigated issue in defining the privilege involves waiver.
55. Id. at 11-12.
56. See id. at 12 n.l I (collecting state statutes recognizing some form of psychotherapist privilege
at the time of Jaffee).
57. Id. at 13.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 15 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 17-18. The Seventh Circuit qualified the privilege, stating that it would not apply if "in
the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the contents of a patient's counseling
sessions outweighs that patient's privacy interests." Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir.
1995).
63. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.
64. See generally Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing Scope of Federal
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REV. LMG. 1 (2000).
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Courts are split regarding when a party's mental or emotional condition is "in issue"
such that the privilege would be waived where the party attempts to recover
damages for mental or emotional distress.
C. Who Is Covered and What Communications Are Protected, by the Privilege?
I. Providers Covered by the Privilege
In general, courts have applied the privilege quite broadly with respect to the type
of provider covered by the privilege and whether a communication is protected.
Some courts have read Jaffee to permit the privilege to be extended to nonlicensed
providers of psychotherapy. In United States v. Lowe," the court extended the
federal privilege to communications with rape crisis counselors. Although the
counselors were required to be neither licensed psychotherapists nor social workers,
the court found that the policies expressed in Jaffee supported a federal privilege for
the communications." Similarly, in Greet v. Zagrocki," the court applied the
privilege to records from the police department's Employee Assistance Program
(EAP), where the counselors were peer counselors with no significant training or
therapeutic expertise."
More recently, in Oleszko v. State Compensation Insurance Fund,' the Ninth
Circuit extended the privilege to unlicensed EAP counselors. The court stated:
The reasons for recognizing a privilege for treatment by psychiatrists
or social workers apply equally to EAPs. EAPs, like social workers,
play an important role in increasing access to mental health treatment.
Growing numbers of EAPs help employees who would otherwise go
untreated to get assistance. The availability of mental health treatment
in the workplace helps to reduce the stigma associated with mental
health problems, thus encouraging more people to seek treatment. EAPs
also assist those who could not otherwise afford psychotherapy by
providing and/or helping to obtain financial assistance.
EAPs work to address serious national problems, from substance
abuse and depression to workplace and domestic violence. Given the
importance of the public and private interests EAPs serve, the necessity
of confidentiality in order for EAPs to function effectively, and the
importance of protecting this gateway to mental health treatment by
licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers, we hold that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee v. Redmond
extends to communications with EAP personnel.
65. 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996).
66. Id. at 99.
67. No. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
68. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond: Where
Do We Go from Here?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1355 (1998).
69. 243 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).
70. Id. at 1157-59 (citation omitted).
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In Finley v. Johnson Oil Co.,7' the court held, where the plaintiff was not
seeking emotional distress damages, "that the federal common law privilege relating
to disclosure of mental health communications between a patient and a physician
does apply" to a general practitioner's notes regarding depression.' The court
reviewed the content of the disputed medical records, observing that the records
contained communications between a patient and a general practitioner that
occasionally mentioned "depression," but mostly dealt with other medical problems,
such as "hip pain."" There were no clinical evaluations of depression or notes of
therapeutic counseling." Nonetheless, the court concluded that "[a]lthough these
items are not strictly notes taken by a psychotherapist, Jaffee indicates that the
scope of the federal mental health privilege is quite broad" and applied the privilege
to the medical records."
In contrast, the court in United States v. Schwensow76 engaged in a thorough
analysis of Jaffee and the policies behind it and did not extend the privilege to cover
communications with two Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) hotline volunteers. In
Schwensow, the defendant went to an Alcoholics Anonymous office to receive
assistance in locating and calling a detoxification center." The AA telephone
hotline operators assisted him in this task, since Schwensow was clearly in a
deteriorated state. They encouraged him to follow through with his plan to enter
treatment, drove him to the detoxification center, and agreed to hold his duffel bag
at the AA office."' The court determined that the AA workers were not qualified
to receive confidential communications because neither volunteer was a licensed
psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or any other kind of counselor.'
Furthermore, the volunteers did not purport to offer counseling services.m The
court stated that the AA workers "did not identify themselves as therapists or
counselors, nor did they confer with Schwensow in a fashion that resembled a
psychotherapy session. '
Another case, Speaker v. County of San Bernardino,' considered whether the
privilege extended to either a Marriage, Family and Child Counselor (MFCC) or a
"psychological assistant," but avoided deciding the case on that issue. In Speaker,
a law enforcement official attended two counseling sessions with a licensed MFCC
71. 199 F.R.D. 301 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
72. Id. at 304.
73. Id. at 303.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also EEOC v. St. Michael Hosp. of Fransiscan Sisters, No. 96-C-1428, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11847 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 1997) (holding that the plaintiff's marriage counseling records fell
within the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
76. 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998).
77. Id. at 652.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 657.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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after he shot and killed a suspect.' The county required officers to attend
counseling sessions after such incidents and arranged the appointments, but the
officers were told the sessions were confidential." A MFCC is licensed to counsel
marital and family relations, not post-traumatic stress. The court noted that the facts
in Jaffee were somewhat similar to those presented and further emphasized that the
Jaffee Court stressed the importance of law enforcement officers receiving effective
counseling after such traumatic incidents.'
Although the Jaffee Court considered it appropriate to extend the privilege to
social workers, the district court in Speaker declined to consider whether it would
extend the privilege to a MFCC or a "psychological assistant" under the supervision
of a licensed psychiatrist.' Instead, the court held that because the defendant
reasonably believed, although mistakenly, that the therapist he consulted was a
licensed psychologist, the privilege still applied." In coming to this conclusion, the
court relied on a similar analysis applied to the attorney-client privilege." The
court noted that, in addition to case law that supports application of the attorney-
client privilege in cases where the client reasonably believes his communications are
with a licensed attorney, several treatises have supported this position for both the
attorney-client and psychotherapist-client privilege.9 The court stated that
commentators urge "that a 'quasi-therapist'/patient privilege should exist where the
patient reasonably, but mistakenly, thought that she or he was being treated by a
psychotherapist. . . . [Commentators] further note that 'the reasonable belief
standard . . . is the same as the one provided for 'quasi-lawyers' . . . and will
undoubtedly be similarly construed."'
2. Communications Covered by the Privilege
For the privilege to apply, the communication must be both confidential and in
the course of diagnosis or treatment. In Schwensow, the court held that the
statements made to the AA volunteers were not made for the purposes of obtaining
treatment' Schwensow did not seek help from the AA volunteers in coping with
his alcoholism.' He had already decided to enter a detoxification center and only
went to the AA office to use the phone 3 The AA workers did assist Schwensow
in looking up the phone number, but the court found that these interactions "did not
83. Id. at 1107.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1108.
86. Id. at 1112.
87. Id. at 1115.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1113-14.
90. Id. at 1114 (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5527 (1980)).
91. United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 1998).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 657-58.
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relate to diagnosis, treatment or counseling of Schwensow for purposes of
attempting to treat his alcoholism.""
With respect to confidentiality, in Kamper v. Gray," the court held that
communications were not covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege where the
police department mandated that officers receive counseling after a shooting, and
the officer knew that the counselor would report findings to the police
department.' However, in Speaker, where the police department mandated that an
officer involved in a shooting receive counseling, the court held that the mandatory
nature of the counseling did not render the communication nonconfidential.'
Unlike the officers in Kamper, Speaker was told that his communications would
remain confidential and the police department did not receive a copy of the
counselor's report.98 Thus, the conversation clearly remained confidential even
though the counseling was mandated by the police department." The court relied
on the underlying public policy interests in the Jaffee decision, noting that the Jaffee
Court emphasized that access to confidential counseling services for police officers
who have been involved in traumatic events is an important public purpose."
Similarly, in Williams v. District of Columbia,' communications made during
mandatory counseling sessions were held to have remained confidential because the
psychotherapist made only a "yes or no" recommendation to the police department
and did not reveal the substance of the communications.'"
D. What Exceptions to the Privilege Have Been Delineated?
1. Crime or Fraud
In 1999, the First Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P.
Violette)," held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is subject to a "crime-
fraud" exception similar to the exception provided under the attorney-client and
physician-patient privileges." Violette, the subject of a federal grand jury
investigation focused on bank fraud and related crimes, allegedly made false
statements to financial institutions and fraudulently induced payments from disability
insurance companies." Two licensed psychiatrists were subpoenaed to testify
against Violette in connection with his fraudulent activities. The psychiatrists
94. Id. at 658.
95. 182 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
96. Id. at 598-99.




101. No. 96-0200-LFO, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23711, at *5-*7 (D.D.C. April 25, 1997).
102. Id. at *5-*7.
103. 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999).
104. See Recent Cases, First Circuit Recognizes Crime-Fraud Exception to the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1539 (2000).
105. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d at 72.
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claimed the psychotherapist-patient privilege on behalf of Violette;' however, the
district court held that the communications were not privileged because the
statements were not made in the course of diagnosis or treatment and the crime-
fraud exception applied. 1 The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that the crime-fraud exception applied and thus the communications were not
privileged.'"
In recognizing the exception, the First Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
envisioned exceptions to the privilege.'" The court analyzed the purpose of the
crime-fraud exception in the context of the attorney-client privilege and determined
that where the crime-fraud exception applies, the need for probative evidence
outweighs the protection of certain communications."' The court explained that
the Jaffee Court "justified the psychotherapist-patient privilege in terms parallel to
those used for the attorney-client privilege," since both exist to foster confidence
and trust required for effective counsel."' Thus, the mental health benefits of
protecting communications made for the purpose of committing a crime or fraud are
outweighed by the need to ascertain the truth."' According to the court, providing
for this exception would not chill legitimate communications, while declining to
recognize the exception would lead to grave abuse of the privilege."'
2. Dangerous Patient
Another exception was considered in United States v. Glass,"4 a criminal
prosecution for knowingly and willfully threatening to kill the President of the
United States. Basing its decision on the rationale expressed in Jaffee, the Tenth
Circuit delineated a test for determining whether a "dangerous patient" exception to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to certain communications. The court
held that the exception did not apply in the instant case where the court was unable
to determine (1) the seriousness of the threat when it was uttered, and (2) whether
disclosure of the threat was the only means of averting harm to the President when
the disclosure was made."' In Glass, the defendant voluntarily admitted himself
to a mental health unit for treatment of his ongoing mental illness after he made a
threat against the President."' The treating psychotherapist nonetheless released
the defendant from the hospital contingent upon him continuing to live with his
father. Ten days after his release, however, the hospital discovered that the
defendant was missing from his father's house, and a nurse contacted local law
106. Id. at 73.
107. Id. at 73-74.
108. Id. at 74.
109. Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
110. Id. at 75-76.
111. Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 77.
114. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 1358-60.
116. Id. at 1357.
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enforcement. Ultimately, because the defendant had made threats against the
President, the Secret Service requested the records of the treating
psychotherapist." 7
Although the defendant claimed the records were protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the government argued that because the defendant
posed a danger to the President, the agents had a duty to warn the President and
therefore the privilege must yield."' The government primarily relied upon
footnote 19 in Jaffee, which states:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future
developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt
that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for
example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist."'
The court in Glass, however, concluded that based on the sparse record, it could not
discern "how ten days after communicating with his psychotherapist, Mr. Glass'
statement was transformed into a serious threat of harm which could only be averted
by disclosure."'" Thus, the court remanded the case to the district court to
determine (1) the seriousness of the threat when uttered, and (2) whether disclosure
of the records was the only means of averting harm. 2' In essence, the court
accepted the existence of a "dangerous patient" exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege on the basis of footnote 19 in Jaffee." On remand, the district
court held the statements were 'properly admissible as an exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.""
' 3
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Hayes,"IU declined to follow the analysis
in Glass where the defendant expressed his desire, during several counseling
sessions, to murder his supervisor at the United States Postal Service and gave
detailed information on the manner in which he planned to commit the crime. The
court stated: "Given that the 'dangerous patient' exception crafted by the Tenth
Circuit in Glass is linked to the standard of care exercised by the psychotherapist,
we respectfully decline to follow that court's treatment of the privilege."'" The so-
called "dangerous patient" exception finds support in the "duty to warn" standard
enunciated in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California"' However, the
Sixth Circuit was not persuaded that disclosure under the "duty to warn" standard
was applicable to the psychotherapist-patient privilege:
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
120. Id. at 1359.
121. Id. at 1360.
122. See generally Nelken, supra note 64, at 33-38.
123. Id. at 35.
124. 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
125, Id. at 584.
126. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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We see only a marginal connection, if any at all, between a
psychotherapist's action in notifying a third party (for his own safety)
of a patient's threat to kill or injure him and a court's refusal to permit
the therapist to testify about such threat (in the interest of protecting the
psychotherapist-patient relationship) in a later prosecution of the patient
for making it.""
Thus, the court ultimately concluded that unless a therapist warns that he will
testify against his patient, there is no constructive waiver. Second, the court
reasoned that the exception would not serve the public-ends rationale in Jaffee
because it would chill communications.'" A patient consulting a psychotherapist
might fear that disclosing information would cause the therapist to decide the patient
was "dangerous" and disclose the confidential information to authorities. Third, the
majority of the states do not provide for such an exception, nor did the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence.'" Thus, the Sixth Circuit characterized footnote 19 in
Jaffee as "an aside" made by Justice Stevens indicating "that the federal
psychotherapist/patient privilege will not operate to impede a psychotherapist's
compliance with the professional duty to protect identifiable third parties from
serious threats of harm."'° Thus, based on "reason and experience," the court held
that the "dangerous patient" exception would not be recognized.
Federal district courts in two states have considered whether the privilege violates
a defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional rights under the Confrontation and
Compulsory Process Clauses.13" ' In United States v. Haworth," the court held
that the records of psychotherapists who had examined a witness for the prosecution
were privileged, in accord with Jaffee, and that the psychotherapists could be cross-
examined, but their records would not be disclosed.' In United States v.
Doyle," a sentencing proceeding in which the government sought an upward
departure for the extreme psychological trauma suffered by the victim, the court
rejected the defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process
outweighed the psychotherapist privilege. The court analogized the privilege to the
attorney-client privilege and refused to conduct an in camera review of the treating
127. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583-84.
128. Id. at 585.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 585. See generally George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REv. 33
(1999); Catherine Olender, No "Dangerous Patient" Exception to Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Testimonial Privilege - United States v. Hayes, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 484 (2000).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. One state case, People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 993 (Cal. 1997),
has also considered a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause argument with respect to the
psychotherapist privilege, and held that the Sixth Amendment does not confer "a right to discover
privileged psychiatric information before trial."
132. 168 F.R.D. 660 (D.N.M. 1996).
133. Id.; see also Nelken, supra note 64, at 39.
134. 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Or. 1998).
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psychologist's and social worker's records to determine whether the protected
communication was helpful to the defendant.'35
E. Under What Conditions Is There a Waiver of the Privilege?
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court indicated that a patient may waive the
psychotherapist-patient privilege." The majority of the cases interpreting Jaffee
deal with this aspect of the decision, and in particular, the patient-litigant
exception.' 3' Essentially, two lines of cases have emerged. Many courts have
defined the patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
broadly.' Under this interpretation, "the exception applies whenever a party
alleges emotional distress damages, regardless of whether the party plans to offer
expert testimony about her mental state at trial or has made a claim for more than
incidental damages for emotional distress."'" A case representative of this view
is Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.,'" an employment discrimination case under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Sarko court "held that the plaintiff
had placed her communications with her psychotherapist 'directly in issue' by
claiming that her clinical depression rendered her a 'qualified individual with a
disability' within the meaning of the ADA."'' Consequently, she would have to
release "all records" of communications with her therapist relevant not only to her
claim of emotional injury, but also to her general emotional condition during her
period of employment with the defendant.'
Similarly, in Vann v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield, Inc.,'" a
sexual harassment case under Title VII, the plaintiff claimed she had suffered
emotional injury due to her employer's inappropriate conduct. Consequently, the
Vann court held that by seeking to admit expert testimony from her therapist on the
issue of emotional injury, the plaintiff had placed her emotional condition in issue
and would be required to produce all relevant records of her therapist.'" The
exception was applied even more broadly in Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority.' In Lanning, the court compelled production of the
plaintiffs' psychiatric records because the plaintiffs sought emotional injury damages,
even though the plaintiffs stipulated that they would not offer expert testimony on
the issue, would not seek damages for treatment of their emotional injury, and were
not alleging an independent tort action for emotional distress.'"
135. lId; see also Nelken, supra note 64, at 39-40.
136. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996).
137. See generally Nelken, supra note 64, at 20-30.
138. Id. at 21.
139. Id.
140. 170 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
141. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 621 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (explaining Sarko).
142. Id.
143. 967 F. Supp. 346 (C.D. 111. 1997).
144. Id. at 349-50.
145. Nos. 97-593, 97-1161, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14510 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997).
146. Id. at *3.
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Other courts, however, have applied the exception more narrowly "in light of
similar exceptions to the attorney-client privilege," finding waiver only where the
privileged communication is put in issue by the patient-litigant. "7 Thus, in
Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark,'" the court held that the privilege is waived only
where the patient either calls his or her therapist as a witness, or introduces in
evidence the substance of any therapist-patient communication."" On this point,
the court in Jackson v. Chubb Corp., ° which adopted a less broad interpretation
of the patient-litigant exception, stated, "[W]here a plaintiff merely alleges 'garden-
variety' emotional distress and neither alleges a separate tort for the distress, any
specific psychiatric injury or disorder, or unusually severe distress, that plaintiff has
not placed his/her mental condition at issue to justify a waiver of the
psychotherapist patient-privilege..''
I1. Revised Uniform Rule of Evidence 503
In 1999, Uniform Rule 503, formerly the "Physician and Psychotherapist
Privilege," was revised to reflect changes in the law of evidence at the federal and
state levels. The revised rule, which offers a general mental health provider
privilege" and provides five additional exceptions to the privilege,'$' was shaped
by the four sources of law analyzed above. First, the U.S. Supreme Court's
recognition of a strong psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee supported
extending the scope of the privilege beyond communications with psychiatrists and-
psychologists to communications with other licensed providers of psychotherapy.
Second, most states recognize a "licensed social worker" privilege independent of
a psychotherapist privilege, thus further supporting the broader scope.' In
147. Nelken, supra note 64, at 21.
148. 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
149. Id. at 230.
150. 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.NJ. 2000).
151. Id. at 225 n.8; see also Fritch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(comprehensively analyzing both lines of cases addressing waiver in light of the rationale for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege under Jaffee).
152. See UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a).
153. See UNIF. R. EVtD. 503(d).
154. UNIF. R. EvID. 503 reporters notes, at 97-98. The Reporter's Notes provide:
The following states have separate statutes creating a so-called "licensed social worker"
privilege: ARIZONA, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-3283 (1996); ARKANSAS, Ark Code Ann.
§ 14-46-107 (1995); CALIFORNIA, CaL Evid. Code §§ 1010, 1012, 1014 (1996);
COLORADO, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107 (1987); CONNECTICUT, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-
146q (1994); DELAWARE, 24 Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 3913 (1995); DIsTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA, D.C. Code § 14-307 (1995); FLORIDA, Fla. Stat. § 90.503 (1996); GEORGIA, Ga.
Code Ann. § 24-9-21 (1996); HAWAII, HRS § 505.5 (1996); IDAHO, Idaho Code § 54-3213
(1996); ILLINOIS, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 225, § 20/16 (1996); INDIANA, Burns Ind. Code
Ann. § 25-23. 6-6-1 (1996); IOWA, Iowa Code § 622.10 (1996); KANSAS, Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 65-6315 (1995); KENTUCKY, Ky. Rule Evid. 507 (1996); LOUISIANA, La.Code.Evid. Art.
510 (1996); MAINE, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 7005 (1988); MARYLAND, Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-121 (1996); MASSACHUSErrs, Mass. Gen. Laws § 112:135A,
135B (1994); MICHIGAN, Mich. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 18.425(1610) (1996); MINNESOTA,
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addition, the exceptions added to Rule 503 also model state trends in recognizing
exceptions to the privilege. Third, the federal courts have refined the privilege
established in Jaffee in light of the rationales for the privilege enunciated by the
Supreme Court in that case.
Finally, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, which are often considered a
persuasive source of the common law, also included a psychotherapist privilege."'
Although proposed Federal Rule 504(b)" limited the definition of "psychotherapist"
only to psychiatrists and psychologists," the Court in Jaffee pointed out that this
limitation "[did] not counsel against recognition of a privilege for social workers
practicing psychotherapy" because the realm of social work and psychotherapy has
changed significantly since 1972 when the rules were proposed." Thus, the revised
Uniform Rule 503 offers a broader scope of persons and communications protected
by the privilege by providing a flexible approach to defining a provider of
psychotherapy.
The revisions to Uniform Rule 503 reflect the view that although a licensed social
worker privilege was necessary, it was not essential to create a separate rule for the
privilege."9 Instead, the revisions incorporate a licensed social worker privilege
into the general mental health provider privilege." In most states, the licensed
social worker privilege is created by a separate statute from that defining the
psychotherapist privilege.'61 The social worker privilege provided by the states
often broadly defines "social work" as the counseling of clients to "enhance or
restore their capacity for physical, social and economic functioning."" Further-
Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1996); MIssIssIPPi, Miss. Code Ann. § 73-53-29 (1996); MISSOURI,
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 337.636 (Supp. 1996); MONTANA, Mont. Code. Ann. § 37-22-401;
NEBRASKA, Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1.335 (1996); NEVADA, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
49.215,49.252,49.235, and 49.254 (1995); NEw HAMPSHIRE, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 330-
A:19 (1996); NEw JERSEY, N.J. Star. Ann. § 45:15BB-13 (1996); NEw MExico, N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 61-31-24 (1996); Naw YORK, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4508 (1996); NORTH
CAROLINA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.7 (1996); OHIo, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.02
(1996); OKLAHOMA, 59 Okla. Stat., tit. 59, § 1261.6 (1995); OREGON, Ore. Rev. Stat. §
40.250 (1996); OEC § 504-4; RHODE ISLAND, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 5-37.3-3, 5-3Z3-4
(1996); SOUTH CAROLINA, S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-95 (1995); SOUTH DAKOTA, S.D.
Codified Laws § 36-26-30 (1996); TENNESSEE, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-11-213 and § 33-10-
(301-304); TEXAS, Tex Rule Civ. Evid. 510 (1998); UTAH, Utah Rule Evid. 506 (1996);
VERMONT, Vt. Rule Evid. 503 (1996); VIRGINIA, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-400.2 (1996);
WASHINGTON, Wash. Rev. Code § 18.19.180 (1996); WEsT VIRGINIA, W. Va. Code § 30-
30-12 (1996); WISCONSIN, Wis. Stat. § 905.04 (1996); and WYOMING, Wyo. Stat. § 33-38-
109 (Supp. 1995).
Id.
155. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1973)
(Proposed Rule 504).
156. Id. at 241.
157. Id. at 240 (Rule 504(a)(2)).
158. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 16 n.16 (1996).
159. UNiF. R. EVID. 503 reporter's notes, at 99.
160. UNtr. R. EvID. 503.
161. UNIF. R. EVID. 503 reporter's notes, at 99.
162. Id. (citing 59 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1250.1(2), 1261.6 (1995)).
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more, the privilege applies to "any information acquired from persons consulting the
licensed social worker in his or her professional capacity."'" Rather than employ
a similarly expansive privilege, however, the revised rule provides a narrower scope,
extending the privilege only to communications relating to "treatment of a mental
or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction."' "
The revised rule offers three definitions of a provider of psychotherapy, with
whom communications would be protected by the privilege: "mental health
provider,"'" "physician,"'" and "psychotherapist."'67  The physician and
psychotherapist definitions remain unchanged from the original Uniform Rule. The
mental health provider definition was added to provide for a general licensed social
worker-type privilege. The revisions provide flexibility by bracketing the language
relating to the provider of psychotherapy, allowing a state to chose whether to adopt
a psychotherapist-patient privilege, a physician-patient privilege, a mental health
provider privilege, or some combination thereof.
In addition to expanding the scope of the privilege, the revised rule adds five
exceptions to Rule 503. The states recognize a combination of over twenty-three
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.'" The exceptions set forth in
the revised rule are generic and broad enough to subsume more specific excep-
tions." For instance, "previously numbered subdivision (d)(4) dealing with
communications relevant to divorce, custody or paternity proceedings" was deleted
since it would be covered under subdivision (d)(3) - the condition "in issue"
exception.'" If the patient's mental or emotional condition is not "in issue" in such
proceedings, there would appear to be no justification for an exception to the
privilege.
Subdivision (d)(4), a crime-fraud exception, was added to comport with the
crime-fraud exceptions present in other privileges, and was drawn from Uniform
Rule 502(d)(1), the crime-fraud exception for the lawyer-client privilege.,
Subdivision (d)(5) applies to communications that indicate that the patient intends
"to kill or seriously injure" a person." This provides a "dangerous patient"
exception, which stems from the "duty to warn" standard enunciated in Tarasoff.'"
Lastly, subdivisions (d)(6), (7), and (8) create exceptions to the privilege where the
competency of, or breach of duty by, the physician, psychotherapist, or mental
163. Id. (citing 59 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1250.1(2), 1261.6 (1995)) (emphasis added).
164. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(b).
165. UNIF. R. EvID. 503(aX2).
166. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(4).
167. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(5).
168. UNiF. R. EvID. 503 reporter's notes, at 100.
169. Id.
170. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT FOR APPROVAL: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM RuLES OF EvIDENCE: WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND REPORTER'S NOTES,
R. 503 reporter's notes, at 102 (1999), available at http.//www.upenn.edulbll/ulc/urelevidam99.pdf.
171. UNIF. R. EvID. 503 reporter's notes, at 101.
172. UNiF. R. EvD. 503 reporter's notes, at 103.




health provider is placed in issue.74 A majority of states also recognize exceptions
similar to (d)(6) and (7) for physicians, psychotherapists, social workers, and other
health care providers.75
174. UNjF. R. EvrD. 503 reporteres notes, at 101-06.
175. See id. (collecting statutes); see also, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 996, 1016 (West 1995)
(applying respectively to the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges, and providing no
privilege as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue
has been tendered by the patient, any party claiming through or under the patient, any party claiming as
a beneficiary of the patient through a contract to which the patient is or was a party, or the plaintiff in
an action brought under section 376 or 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure for damages for the injury
of death of the patient); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(d)(I) (2000) (physician-patient privilege does
not apply to "any cause of action arising out of or connected with physician's or nurse's care or
treatment"); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20B(f) (2000) (no psychotherapist-patient privilege "fi]n a y
proceeding brought by a patient against the psychotherapist, and in any malpractice, criminal or license
revocation proceeding, in which disclosure is necessary or relevant to the claim or defense of the
psychotherapist"); MIcH. CoMp. LAws § 600.2157 (2000) (no privilege under the physician-patient
privilege when the patient brings a malpractice action against the physician); 76 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
19(B) (West Supp. 2001) ("[lIn cases involving a claim for personal injury or death against any
practitioner of the healing arts or a licensed hospital, arising out of patient care, where any person has
placed the physical or mental condition of that person in issue by the commencement of any action,
proceeding, or suit for damages... that person shall be deemed to waive any privilege granted by law
concerning any communication made to a physician or health care provider. . . or any knowledge
obtained by such physician or health care provider by personal examination of any such patient... [if
it is] material and relevant to an issue therein, according to existing rules of evidence."); ALA. R. EViD.
503(d)(4) ("There is no privilege under this rule as to an issue of breach of duty by the psychotherapist
to the patient or by the patient to the psychotherapist."); HAW. R. EVID. 505.5(d)(3) ("There is no
privilege under this rule... [a]s to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the victim
counselor or victim counseling program to the victim."); IDAHO R. EvID. 518 (providing, in the case of
the licensed social worker-client privilege, that "the client waives the privilege by bringing charges
against the licensee"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law. Co-op. 2000) (providing that a licensed social
worker, or nurse "may reveal ... confidences reasonably necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees against an accusation of wrongful conduct"); TEX. R. EVID. 509(e)(1)
(no physician-patient privilege when the proceedings are brought by a patient against the physician,
including malpractice proceedings, and any license revocation proceeding in which the patient is a
complaining witness); King v. Ahrens, 798 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (interpreting ARK. R. EVID.
503(d)(3). which provides that "there is no privilege .. . as to medical records or communications
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condition in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense"); Stigliano v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 658 A.2d 715 (N.J. 1995)
(broadly interpreting the exception to the physician-patient privilege of NJ. R. EviD. 506 and N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-22.4 (West 1994) to apply the waiver not only to the subject of the litigation, but in
regard to all of the physician's knowledge concerning the patient's physical condition inquired about).
But see State v. L.J.P., Sr., 637 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (giving greater scope and
protection to the psychologist-patient privilege of NJ. R. EVID. 505 and NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28
(West 1994) by requiring a showing of legitimate need for the shielded evidence, its materiality to a trial
issue, and its unavailability from less intrusive sources); Humble v. Dobson, No. 95-CA-12, 1996 WL
629535 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1996) (holding a patient waives the physician-patient privilege under a
statutory medical malpractice exception as to communications related causally to physical or mental
injuries that are relevant to issues in the medical claim, action for wrongful death, civil action, or other
authorized claim); Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (waiver of physician-
patient privilege when patient puts physical condition in issue by voluntarily instituting a medical
malpractice action); Christensen v. Munsen, 867 P.2d 626 (Wash. 1994) (holding that, pursuant to REV.
CODE WASH. § 5.60.060(4)(b) (1989), the physician-patient privilege is deemed waived ninety days after
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IV. Conclusion
Most of the existing evidentiary privileges are well settled and in need of only
minor refinement. While suggestions for the establishment of new privileges have
surfaced, they have not gained sufficient support to warrant inclusion in the Uniform
Rules of Evidence. However, the United States Supreme Court's establishment of
the psychiatrist-patient privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in light of
"reason and experience" has spurred substantial analysis and modification of that
privilege in state and federal courts.
The drafters of the Uniform Rules considered these developments in revising the
physician and psychotherapist-patient privilege. The revised mental health provider
privilege broadly applies to "a person authorized, in any State or country, or
reasonably believed by the patient to be authorized, to engage in the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including addiction to alcohol or
drugs."'76 The privilege would thus include licensed social workers under the
rationale of Jaffee," and most likely unlicensed EAP counselors who, under the
rationale of Oleszko,78 would be "authorized" to "engage in the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition.IW9
Exceptions to the privilege include: m communications relevant to the patient's
the filing of a medical malpractice action); Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1994) (same).
176. UNIF. R. EvID. 503(a)(2).
177. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
179. UNiF. R. EVID. 503(a)(2).
180. Uniform Rule 503(d) provides in full:
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule for a communication:
(1) relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if
the [psychotherapist] [physician or psychotherapist] (physician or mental-health provider]
[mental-health provider], in the course of diagnosis or treatment, has determined that the
patient is in need of hospitalization;
(2) made in the course of a court-ordered investigation or examination of the
[physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of the patient, whether a party or a witness,
with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered, unless the
court orders otherwise;
(3) relevant to an issue of the [physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of the patient
in any proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the
patient's claim or defense or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any
party relies upon the condition as an element of the party's claim or defense;
(4) if the services of the [psychotherapist] [physician or psychotherapist] [physician or
mental-health provider] [mental-health provider] were sought or obtained to enable or aid
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the patient knew, or reasonably should have
known, was a crime or fraud or mental or physical injury to the patient or another
individual;
(5) in which the patient has expressed an intent to engage in conduct likely to result
in imminent death or serious bodily injury to the patient or another individual;
(6) relevant to an issue in a proceeding challenging the competency of the




mental or emotional condition that the patient "relies upon ... as an element of the
patient's claim or defense;"'' communications made to a mental health provider
for the purposes of committing or planning to commit a crime or fraud;' com-
munications "in which the patient has expressed an intent to engage in conduct
likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily injury to the patient or another
individual;"'m or communications relevant in a proceeding to challenge the
competency of,'" or address a breach of duty by," the mental health provider.
The Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Rules of Evidence hopes that the
new mental health provider privilege, along with its exceptions, is responsive both
to the rationales enunciated in Jaffee, and to state and federal developments.
(7) relevant to a breach of duty by the [psychotherapist] [physician or psychotherapist]
[physician or mental-health provider] [mental-health provider]; or
(8) that is subject to a duty to disclose under [statutory law].
UNIF. R. EviD. 503(d) (bracketed language in original).
181. UNiF. R. EviD. 503(d)(3).
182. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(4).
183. UNIF. R. EvID. 503(d)(5).
184. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(6).
185. UNiF. R. EvID. 503(d)(7).
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